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Variations in Mediation: How-and
Why--Legal Mediators Change Styles
in the Course of a Case
Dwight Golann"
If the use of alternative dispute resolution is to grow, then dispute resolution
techniques must continue to improve. This is true for several reasons: First, those
who believe in these processes have a natural interest in their advancement. In
addition, after a quarter century of publicity and discussion of ADR in American
legal circles, many of those most receptive to these techniques are already using
them. To convert the skeptics will require that ADR methods become more effective,
or at least that their present effectiveness be more persuasively demonstrated.
Lawyers also increasingly attempt to "spin" neutrals to adversarial ends,' requiring
a more sophisticated response by mediators. Finally, if society increases its support
for court-related ADR,2 those who design and fund these processes, and especially
jurisdictions that require litigants to use them, 3 have a natural stake in their being
delivered effectively.
Curiously, although there has been debate over the appropriateness of various
ADR techniques, 4 there has been relatively little inquiry--at least by legal scholars
--into how these processes actually unfold5 in the general field of American civil

* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., Amherst College, J.D. Harvard Law
School. I wish to thank Marjorie Corman Aaron, who conceived and initiated the filming project
that serves as the basis for this article, and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School which
supported it. Special thanks are also due to the mediators who graciously agreed to demonstrate
their techniques on film: Abraham Gafni, David Geronemus, David Hoffman, James McGuire, Carmin
Reiss, Kathleen Roberts and Margaret Shaw.
1. See, e.g., David Stem, Mediation: An Old Dog With Some New Tricks, 24 LMG. 31 (1998)
(analyzing how mediation can be used as part of a larger litigation strategy).
2. These issues arise, for example, under Professor Sander's concept of a comprehensive justice
center. Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR. 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 3, 5-6 (2000).
3. Professor Sander endorses the concept of requiring disputants at least to sample mediation. Id.
at 7-8. Others have called attention to the special policy concerns that arise when the state requires
disputants to engage in a specific form of ADR. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism andFalse
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizinga Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 949,953-54, 971 (1997).
4. For example, in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 134-64 (1999), the
authors present a story of a legal mediation interspersed with contrasting views of academics
concerning the techniques proper to use in such a process.
5. Recent empirical studies of legal mediation have focused primarily on outcomes: settlement
rates, cost savings and user satisfaction. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF
MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996);
Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled
by FourMajor Service Providers, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 259 (1996); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of
Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas
Courts,33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 565, 579 (1997). The leading compilation of research into what
occurs during the mediation process is KENNETH KRESSEL ET AL., MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE
PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION (1989).
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litigation." In particular, there has been little examination of whether legal mediators
change styles during a single case, or of when and why any such changes occur.7
This article addresses the issue of style, using as its foundation an experiment in
which several professional mediators were asked to resolve the same dispute while
being filmed.
I will seek to show in this article that professional legal mediators in fact use a
variety of styles, and that they change their approach constantly during a single
mediation, even within a single meeting with a disputant.' I will argue that these
stylistic changes are the norm rather than the exception in the mediation of civil
legal disputes 9 and that the use of evaluative techniques' 0 is also frequent, even
among those mediators who favor a broad, facilitative approach. Finally, I will
describe the contrasting styles that the filmed mediators used in the same'dispute
and argue that these variations were caused less by the inherent tendencies of the
mediators than by differences in the tactics and personalities of the disputants with
whom they interacted.
The database. In 1998, 1 participated in an interesting project under the aegis
of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Our goal was twofold: We
wanted to examine the phenomenon of mediator style in legal mediation, and also
to produce new and realistic videotapes of the process.II We created two roleplays
based on actual disputes, one involving a commercial warranty claim and the other
an allegation of age discrimination in employment, 2 and invited seven professional
6. As I discuss later, see infra text accompanying note 23, legal disputes differ from other
controversies such as community disputes in significant ways that have implications for the techniques
appropriate to resolve them. By "professional" legal mediator, I mean a neutral who has established
a successful private practice focused on civil legal disputes. Such mediators have, by definition,
substantial experience and may share common stylistic traits.
7. An exception is Leonard Riskin, who in the article that provides the foundation for my inquiry
commented that mediators tend to have a "presumptive or predominant style," but that many mediators
change style, either from case to case or in perhaps the course of a single process. See Leonard L.
Riskin, UnderstandingMediators 'Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Gridforthe Perplexed,
I HARV. NE-OTIATION L. REV.7, 35-36 & nn.90-91 (1996).
8. Professor Riskin envisioned an "ideal mediator ....sufficiently flexible to employ the most
appropriate orientation, strategies and techniques as the participants' needs present themselves." Id. at
40-41.
9. By "civil legal dispute" I mean a dispute in which a legal claim has been or could be asserted
and that is substantial enough to make it likely that lawyers will become involved as advocates. This
definition excludes most small claims and neighborhood disputes, as well as controversies that have
no potential legal implication. I also exclude marital disputes, because the special nature of that
relationship, often involving serious emotional and psychological issues and the presence of
unrepresented third parties, the children, may well affect the techniques that any mediator would use
to resolve them.
10. Idefine "evaluative" to include assessments about issues other than the legal merits. See infra
Figure 1.
11. The first of the resulting videotapes consists of excerpts from one of the mediations discussed
in this article. Videotape: Mediators at Work: Breach of Warranty? (Program on Negotiation
("PON"), Harvard Law School 1999) (on file with the Case Clearinghouse of PON, Harvard Law
School).
12. The instructions for the commercial warranty case discussed in this article are available from
the Case Clearinghouse of PON. PON, Harvard Law School, "Waltham Construction Supply Co. vs.
Foster Fuels, Inc." (2000) (on file with the Case Clearinghouse of PON, Harvard Law School). The
employment discrimination problem is also available from the Clearinghouse. PON, Harvard Law
School, "Termination Tempest" (1999) (on file with the Case Clearinghouse of PON, Harvard Law
School).
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mediators who practice in Boston, New York and Philadelphia to mediate one of
the two cases. I should note in passing that although we looked initially for mediators
who favored a particular style, 3 none of the neutrals we contacted would admit to
doing so; rather, all said that they adopt a range of styles to fit the needs of each
situation. Among its other aspects, the project allowed us to judge whether these
self-assessments were accurate.
Each neutral was paired with lawyers and played by litigators and law professors
from the Boston area. 4 There was no script, and none of the players had access to
the confidential instructions of other participants. 5 The neutrals were simply asked
to mediate the dispute as they would a real case, and the resulting interactions were
filmed. 6 Each group worked with one of the two scenarios and under the same
external constraints. 7 The sessions, however, evolved in varied ways and reached
different results. This paper is based on two groups 8 that mediated the warranty
dispute.' 9 The mediators in the sessions I will discuss were each experienced neutrals
with successful private practices who also teach mediation at well-known law
schools. Prior to becoming a mediator, both had extensive experience as litigators
in large law firms, and one of them currently carries on a mixed litigation and
13. Leonard Riskin has observed, accurately I think, that even when mediators use multiple styles,
they usually have a tendency to favor some approaches over others. Riskin, supra note 7, at 24-25.
14. Including the neutrals there were a total of 35 players, organized into seven groups of five.
Most disputant roles were played by legal professionals, but a few non-lawyers took on the roles of
lay parties. We considered having the same persons play the disputant roles in each iteration of a
case so as to provide identical conditions for each mediator, but eventually rejected this option.
Among other reasons, we doubted that amateur actors could re-enact their styles and tactics in
successive sessions.
15. The mediators received only the general instructions for the problem, while the disputants
received the general instructions plus confidential instructions specific to their part.
16. A videotape of each of the four sessions discussed in this article is on file with the author.
17. The sessions were limited to four hours apiece, primarily due to the cost of filming. Because
of technical needs, this allowed approximately three and a half hours of actual mediation in each
session. Apart from these time limitations, the role players had to behave naturally in the presence of
outsiders and video equipment and to deal with occasional interruptions.
18. Two sessions, or even all seven conducted as part of this project, provide a slender basis for
generalizations about mediator practice. Still, the results appeared very realistic to me and my codirector, and the participants also remarked that the experience felt identical to actual mediations in
which they had been involved. Excerpts from the tapes have been shown to groups including law
teachers and experienced litigators who have also commented on their realism. I believe that the
results discussed in this article produce, at a minimum, interesting hypotheses, and hope that they
will serve as a starting point for other experiments.
19. The case involved a dispute between a construction firm and a long-time supplier of fuel oil
over the delivery of three barrels of commercial antifreeze which, the plaintiff alleged, was defective
and caused serious damage to the cooling systems of 70 of its heavy trucks. According to the plaintiff,
21 trucks needed complete engine overhauls at a cost of nearly $10,000 apiece, and the other 49
exposed trucks, which had not yet shown damage, suffered a decline in market value of $5,000
apiece, for total damages of $455,000. Statutory legal interest on that sum was an additional $110,000.
In addition to suing the supplier of the antifreeze, the plaintiff brought a claim against the supplier's
insurer, alleging that it had engaged in a bad-faith settlement practice by refusing to make any offer
of compensation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to recover treble damages (an additional
$910,000) plus attorneys fees ($60,000) under state law, for a maximum potential recovery of $1.535
million.
The defendants viewed the plaintiffs liability claim as unsubstantiated by expert evidence, its
damage calculations as inflated, and its unfair settlement practice claim as frivolous. As of the time
of the mediation, the defendants had not made any offer of settlement and the business relationship
between the two companies had ended.
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mediation practice. They both have experience mediating in community dispute
programs, and each emphasizes broad/facilitative techniques in the courses they teach.

I. THE ANALYTIC GRID
To describe mediator styles we need a scale. A few years ago Professor Leonard
Riskin greatly advanced the discussion of mediator style by identifying two key
attributes of neutrals: whether they take a "broad" or "narrow" view of the goals of
the process, and whether they use a "facilitative" or "evaluative" approach in
intervening.2" Professor Riskin also developed a method to display these styles in
a graphic format that I will call the "Riskin grid."'" The Riskin grid has a property
which has not yet been exploited: If mediators do change style as a mediation
unfolds, the grid provides a vehicle to chart and compare their movements.
The Riskin grid must be modified, however, in order to serve as a useful
template for analyzing legal mediation. Legal disputes differ from other
controversies in several ways:
* First, the parties cannot easily walk away from a failed negotiation, since one
or both can draw the other into binding adjudication.
* The fact that both parties' primary alternative to agreement is adjudication
makes it easier to channel them into so-called "principled" bargaining,2 the
relevant principles being the ones that the adjudicator would apply. But it also
means that disagreements about the value of the litigation alternative can assume
exaggerated importance, and it encourages negotiators to treat non-legal issues
as irrelevant.
• Legal disputes have a "scorpions in a bottle" quality, in that the process of
legal discovery and motion practice empowers the parties to inflict significant
costs and aggravation on each other, regardless of the ultimate outcome in
adjudication.
* Legal mediation is distinctive, finally, in that it usually involves attorneys as
negotiators or advisors to the parties. The presence of professional advocates
is helpful when they use their objectivity and experience to move the process
toward a sensible resolution, but it is a complicating factor if parties hand over
a case to litigators and then ignore it, or23if lawyers are influenced by interests
that conflict with those of their clients.
20. The grid is set forth and its implications are explained in Riskin, supra note 7, at 17-35.
Although we can display only two variables on a printed page, most mediators in fact work in
several dimensions, a point recognized by Riskin, see id. at 26 nn.60, 49. A mediator must choose,
for instance, not only whether to be narrow or broad and facilitative or evaluative, but also how
actively to intervene, whether to talk primarily to clients or to lawyers, and so on. See DWIGHT
GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DispuTES, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS
14-23 (1996). All of these choices are important, but only two of them can be shown on a single
grid. The variables identified by Professor Riskin appear to be the most significant, and their use as
classifying criteria therefore seems justified.
21. See Riskin, supra note 7, at 35.
22. The concept of principled negotiation was popularized in ROGER FISHER & WILLAM URY, GETTING
TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMEWr WTiouT GIVING IN 81-94 (Bruce Patton ed., Ist ed. 1981).
23. For an interesting discussion oflawyer traits that can complicate the settlement process, see William
F. Coyne, Jr., The Casefor Settlement Counsel, 14 Ofno ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 367, 375-90 (1999).
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These attributes of legal disputes add an overlay to the usual issues that arise
during mediation. As a result, the Riskin grid does not apply well to legal mediation.
I have modified the grid in several respects, classifying facilitative interventions in
terms of their openness and evaluative comments in terms of their intensity or
specificity, that is, their "hardness." I place the subject of an intervention-the
legal merits, case facts, bargaining, economic issues and personal issues-on the
horizontal, "narrow-broad" axis.24 The resulting "legal grid" is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1

The Legal Mediation Grid
Facilitative
Asks open-ended questions or listens actively
Asks focused questions
Leads analysis of issues or provides information
Asks for opinion
Legal Outcomes

Relevantfacts Bargainingissues Economic issues

Personal Issues

)-Broad

Narrow,.Identifies possibilities /Makes'suggestions /Shows skepticism
Gives an opinion ingeneral terms
Gives an opinion in specific terms and/or with emphasis

Gives personal views of fairness and/or gives an opinion with emotion
Evaluative
24. For example, legal mediators spend a good deal of time privately assessing the strength of the
parties' legal arguments and underlying interests, proposing and advocating settlement options, and
sometimes giving their opinions concerning the likely outcome in adjudication. See KRESSEL ET
AL., supra note 5, at 394, 417-19 ("Despite a persistent ideology that mediators ought to refrain from
pushing their own ideas, it is quite evident that they are often a primary source of settlement proposals
and that they are not at all shy about playing such a role.... Ideology notwithstanding, the research
...shows that most mediators regard pressure tactics as an essential ingredient of their kit bag.");
Marjorie Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in MEDIATING LEGAL DispuTEs, supra note 20,
at 267-305 (discussing situations in which it may be appropriate for a mediator to evaluate the legal
merits). All these behaviors are classified by the Riskin model as evaluative. See Riskin, supra note
7, at 35. At the same time legal mediators are rarely called upon to focus on issues of social change,
which Riskin includes in his definition of a "broad" orientation. Id. at 21-22.
There is also a problem of calibration on the Riskin grid. First, it is not clear how to chart broad
versus narrow approaches if social change is eliminated as a topic. In addition, the model classifies
levels of evaluation by the subject rather than by the intensity with which a mediator delivers a view.
Thus, for example, a statement such as "You're crazy to reject that offer" would be rated by the
Riskin grid as less evaluative than "I don't know, but a jury might have trouble understanding that
theory of causation," because the first opinion concerns the bargaining situation while the second
deals with the trial outcome. If a grid is to be used to chart styles of legal mediators, then inability to
measure the intensity of an intervention is a drawback.
Finally, it seems inappropriate to place facilitation at the bottom and evaluation at the top as in the
Riskin grid; most mediators would agree that facilitation is preferable to evaluation, and the convention
is to put positive values at the top of a graph.
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II. PATTERNS IN MEDIATOR BEHAVIOR
Do mediators in fact change style over the course of a mediation, or do they
maintain a consistent approach throughout the process? To investigate this question,
I will analyze two representative sessions that we filmed, denoted "Mediation A"
and "Mediation B." Because the approaches used by all of the neutrals in their
opening sessions were similar,2" I begin with the first private caucus meeting held
by each mediator. For purposes of charting styles, the participants are identified
by letters: "M" for the mediator, "L" for the lawyer and "P" for the party
representative." The first person to speak in each exchange is shown in bold type.
To identify interactions and show their progression, I have given later interactions
higher subscript numbers: a conversation marked (M2, L2) for example, occurs
after one marked (M1, L1, P1). In the course of each meeting there were usually too
many stylistic variations to be charted legibly, and so I have shown only the more
significant changes on the grid.27 One final note: Because the charts in Figures 2
through 5 show lawyers and parties as well as neutrals, the calibrations of the grid,
which are phrased in terms of what a mediator does, must be construed to fit the
other participants in the discussion. For example, "Leads an analysis," as applied
to a party representative, means that the person is discussing the bargaining situation
with an open mind, whereas "Gives an opinion" means that the disputant is arguing
that a certain proposal or assessment of the merits is correct and should be endorsed
by the neutral.
A. FirstCaucus, FirstMeeting
Figure 2 shows the key interactions during each mediator's first meeting with
a party representative and his or her counsel.

25. All the mediators in our experiment used the same general structure for the process: they
began with a joint session, then worked almost exclusively in caucuses. In each opening session the
neutral introduced him or herself and explained the process. The disputants, through their lawyer,
made an opening statement. If a party representative did not add comments, then the mediator
typically asked the representative whether he or she wished to add anything. The neutral then
moderated a question-and-answer period, asked questions him or herself, and made a transition to
private caucuses, where the disputants remained for almost all the rest of the process.
26. The plaintiff is represented in the roleplayed case by its vice president, a lay person, the
defendant-supplier by its inside counsel, and the defendant-insurer by both defendants' outside
litigator.
27. For legibility reasons, comments about bargaining issues are placed beside the vertical axis
rather than superimposed on it, and multiple comments at a particular point on the grid are grouped
next to each other but on different lines of type. The placement of one symbol slightly to the left or
right or above or below another has no substantive significance.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2000/iss1/7

6

Golann: Golann: Variations in Mediation

2000]

Variations in Mediation

Figure 2

First Caucus-First Meetings
Facilitative
Open Q 's/Listens
Focused Q's
Analysis/Info.
Asks for Opinion
Broad

Narrow
Suggests/ID 'sPoss.
GeneralOpinion

L7 P,

Specific/Emphatic

,

P3

2

P13
P2

i

t: 9 r 5

L:
L13

T-t;

P2

"6

o

10

Personal/Emotional

Evaluative
Legal

Factual

Negotiation

Personal

Economic

Facilitative
Open Q's/Listens
Focused Q's
Analysis/Info.
__
_

_Ms

M,

Asks for Opinion

M,
M

___[4'

Broad

Narrow
Suggests/ID's Poss.
P I.

General Opinion

T

P

P

P

I pP

Specific/Emphatic
Personal/Emotional

Evaluative
Legal

Factual

Negotiation

Economic

Personal

These results are interesting in several respects. First, it is apparent that the
two mediators do not maintain a single approach, either as to the subjects they
discuss or the approaches that they use to discuss them. Rather, each neutral moves
constantly between sectors of the grid. Mediator A shows more variation in
approach, but this is probably because the first meeting in Session A was
considerably longer than in Session B (forty-eight versus sixteen minutes).
Is there a pattern in what occurs? Each session begins with a phase in which
the mediator probes for information while the disputants argue about legal, factual
or business issues. Each discussion then moves into a phase in which bargaining
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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issues predominate. These two phases appear on Figure 2 as follows.
Information Phase. Each mediator begins in a broad/facilitative mode (M,).
In mediation A, the litigator answers, arguing his client's legal case (L,). Narrow
legal responses to broad questions are common in legal mediation and pose a
practical problem for the neutral: If he or she continues to ask about broad issues,
the mediator and the disputant will be focusing on different topics, making at the
least for an awkward conversation. This is probably why mediator A moves to the
narrow part of the spectrum, focusing on factual issues but without adopting the
disputants' evaluative tone (M2). In caucus B, by contrast, the party representative
responds to the mediator's initial question, and describes how the defendant's
negligence has harmed his business (P,). Mediator B, after touching on legal matters
(M2) focuses on business issues (M3,), again in response to the disputants' lead.28
BargainingPhase. After about the same amount of time (fourteen minutes
into Session A and twelve minutes into Session B), each mediator shifts focus to
the negotiation process, asking disputants what they are prepared to do to advance
the bargaining (Session A, M3.6, Session B, M,). Thus in Mediation A the neutral,
after summarizing the legal arguments he has heard, asks, "Given all that, why are
you here?," and a few minutes later comments, "When I talk with the other side,
they're going to ask if there's been a proposal . . . ." In each session the focus of
the discussion moves to bargaining.
As the subject shifts, each mediator's manner also changes. Both neutrals
have remained in a facilitative mode while talking about the legal merits, at most
asking pointed questions about issues that the parties appeared to be glossing over.
(For example, mediator A says to both disputants, "As [the lawyer] said, these
things can often be a 50-50 proposition .... I guess what I'm wondering is... if
the judge or the jury believes the other side's expert, doesn't that create at least the
possibility that... ?"). Once the conversation turns to bargaining issues, however,
each mediator begins to make mildly to moderately evaluative statements (Session
A) M9 ,,,3, Session B, M6 ). Some of their comments take the form of observations
about how the other side may be perceiving the bargaining situation, and what it
may be expecting from a settlement. For example in mediation A:
Lawyer A:
Mediator A:
Lawyer:
Mediator:
Lawyer:
Mediator:

Lawyer:

They spent, according to them $210,000 [on engine
overhauls].
And how much in legal fees?
I don't see... frankly, those are sunk costs. We've had
legal fees too and I don't think that they$60,000 to date? I think is... [looking at his notes]
Is that what they've said? Something like $60,000.
I think something like that. So 210 plus 60 would get
them, I mean in their eyes, back to zero.... I'm sorry,
did I interrupt you?
Well, that may be helpful, but I mean we've also spent
$60,000, and I think that their ability to recover that at

28. In this case the defendant-supplier's economic interest is to re-establish a business relationship
with the plaintiff and to protect its commercial reputation.
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trial is frankly negligible - that is, the attorney's fees.

The mediator here is intervening to give his assessment that the plaintiff probably
sees the money it has spent on lawyers as "damages" that will have to be included
in any settlement, regardless of whether it would be able to recover such fees at
trial.
Each mediator also gives opinions about what is needed to advance the negotiation
process (Session A, M11, Session B, M6). Here, for example, is Mediator A:
Mediator:

Lawyer:
Mediator:

Well, let me do this. I want to suggest two other possible
approaches to settlement here because frankly, I think if
I communicate your offer of $38,500 plus a promise that
they will keep all of this under wraps, they very well might
say, "The mediation is over." I've seen that happen and
perhaps you have seen negotiations end because of that.
With a demand of $1.5 million, even if they feel that gives
them a good deal of room to move, they could very
possibly say to you, "That's not a strong enough offer,"
and they're not going to counter. In which case you are
going to be in a position where you are going to be asked
to bid against yourselves, which most parties are very
reluctant to do. So then we wind up in a bit of a stalemate.
Whenever I am mediating, I feel like it's part of my job
to reason together with the side I am meeting with. I
don't know what their reaction might be. They may think
$38,500 is a good starting point. I have a gut-level hunch
that they will view that as pretty light.
Given [the plaintiff vice president's] rather wooden
demeanor, I would say that you are probably right.
[smiling] So we are sort of on the same wavelength in
terms of the assessment of where they are. So that leaves
me thinking a few things. Number one, might itbe prudent
to move your offer to a number that is more likely to
motivate a response from the other side? That's question
number one. Question number two: Might it be sensible
to include in your proposal, or as an alternative, something
about possible business dealings?

After conferring privately, the defendants raise their offer to $75,000.
In this phase of the meeting, both mediators appear to be acting according to
implicit rules:
* A mediator should begin a first caucus meeting by asking broadly
facilitative questions. Lawyers usually respond by arguing the legal
merits, while parties may remain silent or discuss either legal or business
issues. The disputants generally speak in an evaluative manner, arguing
the strength or fairness of their positions.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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*

After spending some time gathering information about the case facts and
legal issues in the dispute, as well as about non-legal interests if the
disputants are willing to discuss them, a mediator should focus on
bargaining and ask the disputants to make a proposal.
* A mediator should not at this stage evaluate the legal merits or the parties'
non-legal interests.
* A neutral may, however, evaluate the bargaining: How the other side is
seeing the situation and what stance toward them is likely to advance the
negotiation.
In their first private meeting with a party, all four mediators who dealt with the
warranty dispute used approaches similar to the one described above. Some showed
more persistence in probing the parties' interests or greater skepticism about their
factual assertions, but the pattern at this stage of the case was similar: The mediators
spread their comments along the broad-narrow axis, remained facilitative, and if
they evaluated at all, focused only on the bargaining situation. The disputants talked
about a more limited range of subjects and were moderately to emphatically evaluative
throughout. This may reflect a consensus, both among professional neutrals and
among civil litigators, about how to conduct an initial caucus in a dispute of this
type.

29

B. Stylistic VariationsAmong Mediators
The styles used by mediators A and B diverged as they went on to meet with
the other party in the dispute. These meetings are charted in Figure 3 on the
following page.

29. The same general approach is demonstrated in Videotape: Mediation in Action: Resolving a
Complex Business Dispute (CPR Institute of Dispute Resolution 1994) (popularly known as "Prosando
v. High Tech") (on file with the University of Missouri-Columbia Center for the Study of Dispute
Resolution).
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Figure 3
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Both neutrals again begin in a broadly facilitative style (M), but soon focus
more narrowly on factual and legal issues (mediation A, M2,,,6, mediation B, M4 9 ).
During this phase, however, mediator B shows skepticism and gives opinions
concerning the defendants' factual arguments (M, 0, 2). Thus, for instance, mediator
A, told by the plaintiff's vice president that to pursue the case through trial will
cost only $20,000, turns to the litigator and says in a "just checking" tone, "Is $20,000?
." Counsel quickly responds: "It's probably a little light." (M6 ). Mediator B
also asks about future litigation costs, but does so in an abrupt and skeptical manner:
"How much is it going to cost to try this case?" (M, 2). Mediator B also shows more
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emphatically his disagreement with the disputants' bargaining tactics (compare
M,01. inA with M.,,,, inB). At one point, for example, mediator B says to defense
counsel: "If I go back and I say 'They're willing to give you a discount, but that's
it,' we've got a big problem, and we're going to have a short afternoon, I think.
I could be wrong .*.".
."o (M,,). Finally, a larger proportion of mediator B's
interventions (two of A's and five of B's) are made in an evaluative manner.
What accounts for these differences? It is not the facts of the dispute, which
by definition are identical. Is the variation due to their stylistic predispositions? It
seems unlikely that mediator A is inherently facilitative and B consistently
evaluative. Both neutrals have similar professional backgrounds, except that
mediator A continues to litigate as well as mediate while B is a full-time neutral,
and both emphasize facilitative skills in their teaching. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows,
during the first caucus meetings B was if anything more consistently facilitative
than A; their styles begin to diverge only during their meetings with the second
party.
The differences that appear during the second meetings may stem in part from
a tactical choice made by each neutral. In the warranty dispute, all of the mediators
faced an initial problem: the plaintiff was making an aggressive claim for treble
damages and demanding the highest amount that it could possibly recover in court,
and the defendants had offered nothing in reply. In these circumstances, Mediator
A elected to meet first with the defendants hoping, as he explained later,3 to obtain
an offer from them before he asked the plaintiff to compromise.
Mediator B elected to meet first with the plaintiff. He may have done so
because during his opening session the plaintiff lawyer had accused the defense of
unethical litigation conduct, provoking an angry exchange. Given this difficult
beginning, Mediator B may have felt that the plaintiff side needed his attention
first. In his first meeting, Mediator B persuaded the plaintiff's vice president to
authorize him totell the defendants that the plaintiff would be willing to show
"significant flexibility" once the defense put a "number" on the table. The vice
president adamantly refused, however, to bid against himself by reducing his demand
by any specific amount; he said that he could not go back to the plaintiff's CEO,
who was his father-in-law, "and report that I reduced my demand against no offer.
I cannot do that. I will not." (P,). Mediator B thus went into his second meeting,
with the defense representatives, without a specific concession to offer, which may
have hardened their attitude.
Although these differences in the tactical situation probably had an impact on
the styles used by the two mediators in their next meetings, a review of the videotapes
suggests that the variation was due primarily to other factors. Mediator A met with
a plaintiff team that, after arguing the merits and threatening to spread harmful
comments about the defendant supplier's reputation, agreed to cut its demand in
half from $1.5 million to $750,000 (P, 3). Mediator B, by contrast, encountered a
defense counsel who used a two-pronged strategy: He first spoke about the
desirability of finding a "marketplace resolution" of the dispute and on behalf of
30. The italics mark words on which the speaker placed particular emphasis.
31. These and other comments concerning a mediator's thoughts and intentions are based on the
author's discussions with the neutrals after filming had been completed.
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the defendant supplier offered a multi-year contract to supply the plaintiff with
fuel at a discount price. However, he then said that the plaintiff's weak legal case
and outrageous settlement demand made it impossible for the defendant's insurer
to offer any money at all. "Paying them money to settle this law suit," he said, "is
a holdup," which would expose both his insurer-client and himself to unacceptable
demands from the same opposing lawyer in the future32 (L,).
Counsel's stance put mediator B in a difficult position. He had already been
told by the plaintiffs representative that a cash offer was a prerequisite to any
monetary concession. In addition, half of the time allotted to the mediation had
expired and neither side had yet offered a specific compromise on the money issue.
The neutral listened for a few minutes to defense counsel explain why his "no
cash, all coupon" proposal was the right solution and then commented in an
evaluative tone: "I will tell you ... that we are going to have an extremely hard
time selling these folks on a no-cash settlement in my judgment. If that's what
we've got to work with, well OK... but ..... (M). Mediator B said again that for
both bargaining and psychological reasons the plaintiff needed to hear a cash offer.
The defense continued to refuse to offer any money.
The mediator then directed the conversation to the merits, asking counsel in a
facilitative tone to "put on your trial lawyer hat in my chair," and assess the litigation
risks (M9). After the defense team argued strongly that the plaintiff had no expert
to support its theory of causation, mediator B asked pointed questions such as:
"How many cases have you been involved in, in which there was only an expert on
one side, and the other side could not find any expert who would contradict him?
How many?" (M 0) The conversation returned to the bargaining and the mediator
stressed what he called a "practical negotiation problem. I'm not going to get them
to be realistic without some help from you... I'll do what you want me to do, but
if I have to go back there and tell them, 'There ain't going to be no money today'.
. . it may be a short day.. . ."(M,,) Defense counsel responded, in a chiding,
disappointed tone, "We need you to be more creative than that." The mediator
listened to counsel explain how he should persuade the plaintiffs vice president to
sell his father-in-law on the view that he was "a hero rather than a bum" because he
had obtained a long-term fuel supply at an attractive price. The neutral then asked
the brusque question mentioned above: "How much is it going to cost to try this
case?" (M,,) This query could have been posed in a facilitative way, but as delivered
it implied strong disapproval of what the lawyer had been saying.
What caused mediator B to adopt a more evaluative style than mediator A? It
may be that mediator B was inherently more willing to "go evaluative" than A, but
32. The defense counsel in this case faced an ethical problem. One of his clients, the supplier of
the allegedly defective product, had a strong business interest in reestablishing a relationship with
the plaintiff, if only to prevent it from disparaging the defendant's products in the future. The
insurer-client, however, was primarily interested in minimizing the amount of money it paid on the
claim. In Session B, counsel added to his ethical problem by suggesting that he could not offer a
monetary settlement on behalf of the supplier because of concern that it might hurt his bargaining
stance on behalf of his insurer-client in future cases. In the four roleplays of the case, the mediators
generally avoided grappling with this problem, apparently not wishing to alienate a person whose
help they might need to bring about a settlement. The ethical issues posed by defense counsel's dual
representation, both for counsel and perhaps also for the mediator, are interesting but beyond the
scope of this article.
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it is also true that he found himself in a more difficult situation than his counterpart.
Mediator B later said that he had felt at the time that defense counsel was using
what might be termed a "distributive tactic in integrative clothing," i.e. making his
"no cash-all coupon" proposal in part to delay for as long as possible offering cash,
and that to facilitate this strategy would simply anger the plaintiff. This, combined
with the time factor, led mediator B to communicate his skepticism about the
defendants' legal contentions and strongly challenge their bargaining strategy.
Stylistic Progression. We have seen that both the subjects that mediators pursue
and the approaches they use can change repeatedly within a single caucus session.
But is there any consistent pattern or evolution in neutrals' styles over the course
of a mediation? For example, are mediators likely to be found in particular areas
of the grid during different phases of a case? Many publications describe mediators
as emphasizing a broad-facilitative approach, helping disputants to focus on their
underlying interests and then, on the assumption that this will be effective, working
with them facilitatively to develop broad options for settlement. 33 The case that
was being mediated, involving a disruption in a long-term commercial relationship,
lent itself to such an approach. But did the mediation sessions actually follow this
integrative model? For an answer, we need to look at later caucus meetings in the
same two mediations.
Later Caucuses. We return to mediations A and B about three and one-half
hours into each mediation, thirty minutes before the deadline for ending the process.
Both mediators are meeting with the same parties as when they began caucusing,
mediator A with the defendants and mediator B with the plaintiff. Both meetings
are affected by events that precede them: Mediation A by the fact that the mediator
is bringing back a lower demand from the plaintiff (reduced from $750,000 to
$320,000) as well as confidential information that the plaintiff claims will weaken
the defense case at trial, and mediation B by the fact that the defense counsel has
shown for the first time a willingness to offer cash as part of a settlement. Figure
4 on the following page charts the two sessions.

33. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, WHAT EVERY LITIGATOR NEEDS TO KNow ABOUT
MEDIATION: STUDY GUIDE 2 (1993) ("In practice, mediation assists parties' identification of their
real interests .... The mediator assists the parties in rising above the complications of individuals'
personalities and emotions, and allows parties to reach a constructive, mutually acceptable solution
..... "); CPR INSTITUTE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MEDIATOR'S DESKaOOK 2 (1999) ("The role of
the mediator is multifaceted: Manages the mediation process for the parties; Opens communications
between the parties; ... Probes facts, positions and interests of parties; Actively keeps parties focused
on problem solving; Assists the parties in creating and refining settlement options .... );
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Figure 4
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Session A. We see that mediator A begins in a dual mode, combining evaluative
comments about the plaintiff's new bargaining position with the new factual
information; the grid thus shows two M,'s. Defense counsel responds by arguing
both points. The mediator then emphasizes the risks of trial and offers an opinion
on a legal issue (M2). Although the mediator uses evenhanded language ("Both
sides have to reckon with a high degree of uncertainty.... The evidence seems to
point in different directions"), his comments are probably interpreted as evaluative
by the defendants, who have been arguing that they have much the stronger case.
As in the first caucus, mediator A then moves to the less charged topic of bargaining.
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He begins at a general level (M3), then points out again that from the plaintiff's
perspective a "make whole" number would include attorneys' fees (M4).
At this point, the focus of the discussion changes to broader bargaining issues.
The instigator, however, is the litigator rather than the neutral. The outside counsel
suddenly says, "All right, tell you what we'll do... and it's only because the hour
is late . . ." He offers to reimburse the plaintiff for the entire amount it claims to
have spent on engine overhauls ($206,000), if the plaintiff will agree to enter into
a one-year contract to buy diesel fuel from the defendant at an attractive price
(L,).34 Regarding the other side's need for attorneys' fees, he replies, "They have
to understand, they have emotion on their side, we have emotion on our side." He
then describes for the first time an incident in which the plaintiffs sales manager
humiliated the defendant supplier's marketing vice president while he was in the
middle of a sales pitch by denigrating the defendant's products (L6). (The comment,
as recounted by defense counsel, was "Still selling that crap antifreeze, are you?")
The lawyer who presents these business-oriented terms and highlights an emotional
issue is the same person who until now has deflected the mediator's questions
about these topics. The neutral welcomes the initiative, clarifies its terms (M,),
and goes to speak with the plaintiff.
Session B. At the start of this caucus, mediator B and the plaintiff's lawyer
have just returned from a meeting with the defendant's outside counsel, a discussion
that was held at defense counsel's request outside the presence of either of the
party representatives. 35 In this caucus the focus of conversation is largely on
bargaining, with the mediator helping the plaintiffs vice president to assess the
situation and sort out tactical options. Mediator B alternates between evaluative
comments about the other side's bargaining stance ("First thing [counsel] rattled a
saber.... I'm finally seeing some breaks in the ice .... ") (Ml, M2), questions
intended to help the vice-president assess his needs ("What dollar range [is it] that
the discount would equate to?") (M3), and an evaluation of the plaintiff's proposal
("You're... almost double the hard out-of-pocket [damages]. . . so I'm a little
worried about that.") (M4). The vice-president is not offended by these evaluative
comments; instead he asks both the mediator and his counsel to give him an
assessment of the other side's intentions (P4):
"Can either of you gentlemen tell me your expectation of
Party:
the best dollar I can get out of here today?"
Mediator:
"I honestly don't know yet."
"But I'm hearing from you ... that you don't think that
Party:
number is 750 [thousand dollars]."
"No, for sure and for certain not."
Mediator:
The plaintiff representative then agrees to put forth a lower demand which the
34. Illustrating the subjectivity inherent in charting styles, or perhaps the limitations of the grid,
defense counsel's comments could be placed either in the neutral category of bargaining, the
moderately broad category of business issues, or the broadest category, emotional concerns.
35. The outside defense lawyer suggested that the litigators meet with the neutral alone after the
supplier's inside counsel began to speak with increasing emotion, characterizing the mediation process
as a "shakedown." After hesitating, the mediator agreed to convene a counsel-only meeting.
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mediator takes to the other side.
To a degree, the caucuses in mediations A and B follow a similar pattern,
which differs from the first meetings that each neutral held with the same party.
* These later caucuses are much shorter in duration, perhaps because the mediator
has completed the process of gathering information and the participants are
aware of the approaching deadline for concluding the process. 6
* The conversation focuses more on the bargaining situation and less on factual
information or legal arguments. Especially in Session B, this shows as a
clustering of symbols at the "negotiation" or "zero" point of the horizontal
axis.
* Each session deals with new issues, but in each instance the shift is initiated by
defense counsel and not the mediator.
• Both mediators are more evaluative in the later caucuses, again focusing
primarily on the bargaining situation. 7
The FinalStages. Figure 5, on the following page, shows the interactions
between mediator A and the parties at the end of the process. (Mediator B's
interactions are not charted because they showed less variation; the discussion in
mediation B focused solely on bargaining issues, the mediator varying between
facilitative and evaluative interventions.)

36. Both neutrals joke about this phenomenon. Mediator A, for example, says that legal mediations
are "like NBA basketball games - all the excitement happens in the last few minutes."
37. Probably because mediator A has just brought back controversial evidence from the other
side, he also comments on a specific legal issue, expressing doubt about defense counsel's prediction
that he will be able to keep the data from being admitted into evidence at trial.
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Mediator A begins with the plaintiff team, presenting the previously-mentioned
defense proposal for a cash payment of $206,000 plus a one-year fuel contract. He
stresses its advantages and also suggests that in light of the fact that "there is no
concrete evidence of causation," the liability issue "may be a very close question"
at trial )(see dual M,'s). The vice president reacts negatively to the contract aspect
of the proposal. The mediator inquires about this (M2) and is told that the
representative has bad feelings about "the whole history" of the case, as well as
what he sees as the supplier's "inferior product" (P2)- Counsel adds that he thinks
the defense "played games" with the test sample it produced during discovery.
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The mediator then emphasizes the advantages of the offer, noting that it
represents fifty percent of the plaintiff's "make whole" number ("If you say that's
it is a 50-50 case.. . when you have the opportunity to settle a case that's... a
horse race ... at 50 cents on the dollar. . . .") The mediator notes that they have

made "tremendous progress" and stresses that "the case could settle." He later
meets with the vice president alone, the litigator having gone to court,3" and is told
that based on a risk analysis, the plaintiff would be willing.to settle in the middle
$200,000's. The mediator again inquires about including a fuel contract (M4), but
is told by the plaintiff vice president that it is "not an option." At this point, he
makes a mediator's proposal 9 to settle the case at $220,000 in cash (M,) plus a
confidentiality agreement, and the vice president agrees.
Mediator A then meets with the defendant's inside counsel (again the litigator
has left). After explaining that the plaintiff will not agree to a renewed contract, he
suggests that the case settle at slightly more than $206,000 (M1); she counters that
she was never at $206,000 without a contract because of the value of a renewed
relationship to her company. The mediator discusses the bargaining and then makes
his $220,000 proposal (M,). When the inside counsel hesitates, he rises from his
chair and sketches the converging patterns of offers and demands on a flip chart,
emphasizing that while the defense has come a long way in the negotiation, the
plaintiff has come even farther (M3 ).40 He also stresses how close his $220,000
proposal is to $206,000. Arguing that a difference of this magnitude is not enough
to justify either side incurring the large cost of trying the case, he "strongly
encourages" her to think about his proposal as one that makes sense for both sides
(M4). She indicates that the mediator's proposal is "not unpalatable" but that she
would like to talk with her father, the defendant's CEO. The mediator strongly
encourages her to do so and the session ends.
The disputants in Sessions A and B both reach settlements, but on substantially
different terms. While in A, both sides eventually accept a cash settlement at
$220,000 with confidentiality, in B the defendants had insisted from the beginning
that any settlement would have to be based on a renewed supply contract, while the
plaintiff had insisted that it would have to include money. The mediator worked
within these structures, pushing each side to accept what the other required.
Mediation B culminated in an agreement that the defendants would pay the plaintiff
$99,000 and the parties would enter into a five-year fuel supply contract at a
38. In fact, both of the lawyers who played outside litigators in mediations A and B had to leave
before the end of the session. The mediator was reluctant to proceed on a pro se basis, but did so for

filming purposes and after inquiring of the party representatives whether they were comfortable
going forward on this basis.
39. A mediator's proposal is one that is presented by the neutral to both sides under the ground
rule that if both sides agree, there is a settlement, but that if either one refuses the proposal, it will not
learn whether the other side accepted it. The primary advantage of the method is that a party can
privately indicate its willingness to compromise without being concerned that its bargaining position

will be compromised if there is no agreement. A disadvantage is that if the mediator expresses a
view of the "right" solution and is unsuccessful, he or she may have difficulty advocating other
options. For a further explanation of this technique, see GOLANN, supra note 20, at 57-59.
40. The plaintiff in mediation A began at $1.535 million, dropped to $750,000 and then to $320,000
(just before the mediator made his proposal, the vice president had indicated privately that he would
be willing to drop further, to about $233,000). The defendants countered with offers of $75,000,
then $100,000, and finally $206,000 with a fuel contract.
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discounted price.
The other iterations of the same case reached different results. The third session,
Mediation C, was conducted by a mediator with a relatively narrow-facilitative
style. The disputants in that session reached a settlement that included money plus
a renewed business relationship. Again the turning point came when the defendants
proposed adding a discounted-price fuel supply contract to what had until then
been an entirely monetary negotiation. Mediation C settled at $140,000 plus a
five-year fuel contract. In a fourth iteration, Mediation D, the neutral pursued
underlying interests with persistence, but also offered the most specifically
evaluative comments about possible trial outcomes. The disputants in that session
settled at $140,000 in cash.
What accounts for these variations? Although there were differences in the
stylistic tendencies of the neutrals, they do not correspond to the differences in the
outcomes. Mediator A, for example, was perhaps the most facilitative and broadly
oriented of the four, but he ultimately recommended a wholly distributive solution,
while mediator C, despite a narrower orientation, obtained an integrative result.
Again the causes appear to lie in the personalities and strategies of the persons
playing the disputants. In all four sessions, defense representatives proposed a
new business relationship; the key factor in whether an integrative deal emerged
was the attitude of the plaintiff's vice president. In mediation A, the person playing
this role was a young lawyer eager to show his toughness; he interpreted his
instructions literally and ruled out any renewed relationship with the defendant
supplier. In mediation C, by contrast, the plaintiffs vice president was played by
an associate law dean who read the same instructions more flexibly, agreeing to
entertain a proposal for a new contract. Their differing attitudes drove the outcome
in each session.
The constraints of the experimental setting probably also affected how each
mediator conducted the process. In a real case of this kind a private mediator
would likely reserve a full day, but because of filming constraints each roleplayed
session was limited to three and a half to four hours. Some neutrals later commented
that the shortness of time discouraged them from probing as deeply as they would
have wished into non-legal issues, an effect that has implications for ADR design.4'
In addition, several of the players seemed to feel a strong obligation to reach
agreement. This may simply be a manifestation of the so-called "settlement effect," 2
that is, the influence that a deadline can have on a negotiation. This said, however,
the dynamics of the roleplayed sessions were remarkably similar to the feelings
that the author has observed in actual mediations.
41. This effect is also felt in a well-regarded court program in Cambridge, Massachusetts, known
as the Middlesex Multi-Door Courthouse ("MMDC"). The MMDC is patterned on Professor Sander's
proposal for a facility that would offer litigants multiple options for dispute resolution. See Sander,
supra note 2, at 5-6. The MMDC, which employs a panel of trained and experienced mediators,
focuses on civil claims exceeding $25,000. Parties are typically asked to make a three to four hour
commitment to mediation at a cost of $350 to $450 apiece. Nothing prevents the process from
continuing after this initial commitment and often it does, but some MMDC panel members have
acknowledged feeling the need to show progress within the presumptive time limit. This discourages
them from pursuing the lengthy, sometimes wandering discussions that may be required to discover
and flesh out an interest-based solution.
42. For an explanation of the "settlement effect," see GOLANN, supra note 20, at 154-62.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
The data from this project yield many intriguing possibilities and permit a few
firm conclusions. Professional legal mediators do not in fact appear to maintain a
consistent style throughout a case, but instead change their approach frequently
within each meeting they hold with a party. Such mediators tend to begin in a
broad-facilitative mode, but they are often forced by the advocates to focus on
narrow legal and factual issues. Over the course of a mediation they inquire
repeatedly about the participants' non-legal concerns, but often with little or no
initial success.
The results do not support a conclusion that legal mediators are consistently
either facilitative or evaluative, or that they readily evaluate litigation outcomes.
The neutrals in our experiment did become increasingly evaluative over the course
of the process, but their evaluative comments focused largely on the bargaining
situation: What the other side was thinking and feeling, and which approach was
most likely to move the process forward. As a mediation evolved, the mediator
was likely to make comments or ask questions that suggested a view, or at least
skepticism, about the strength of factual assertions or legal arguments made by the
disputants, but almost all of these comments were framed in general terms. Only
one mediator gave even a tentative opinion about who was likely to prevail in
court, and no one placed a specific value on the case. The styles of the mediators
over the course of the process did vary significantly, but the differences appeared
to be driven much more by the personalities and approaches of the disputants than
by tendencies of the neutrals.
The inquiry described in this article involved only four neutrals working with
one dispute, and the results may at most describe the approaches of professional
legal mediators in a particular type of case. To determine how other mediators,
practicing in other settings and dealing with other kinds of disputes, approach their
work requires additional investigation. At a minimum, however, the results of this
inquiry suggest that the issue of mediator style is more complex and the styles
themselves more variable than is often supposed. Understanding how and why
legal mediators change their approaches and goals will help us to develop a more
sophisticated theory of how mediation can support the ne, otiation process.
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